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Abstract
Anecdotes abound regarding the decline of basic research in industrial and governmental
settings, but very little empirical evidence exists about the phenomenon. This article pro-
vides a systematic and historical analysis of the contribution of various institutional sectors
to knowledge production at the world and country levels across the past four decades. It
highlights a dramatic decline in the diffusion of basic research by industrial and governmen-
tal sectors across all countries—with a corresponding increase in the share from universi-
ties—as well as an increase of partnerships between universities and other sectors. Results
also shows an increase in the relative share of industries in applied research, as measured
through patents. Such divergence in university and industry research activities may hinder
industries’ ability to translate basic knowledge into technological innovation, and could lead
to a growing misalignment between doctoral training and future job expectations. Industries
and universities must rethink strategies for partnerships and publishing to maximize scien-
tific progress and to ensure the greatest gains for society.
Introduction
Bell Labs was once one of the most prominent industrial research laboratories in the United
States—associated with eight Nobel prizes and lauded for major technological developments
such as the transistor and the laser. However, personnel declined from 30,000 to 1,000 employ-
ees between 2001 and 2009, as a result of the termination of its basic research program [1,2].
Basic science saw similar disinvestment in Canada a few years later when the century-old
National Research Council (NRC)—Canada’s largest research organization, associated with
three of the country’s Nobel prizes—explicitly changed funding priorities to deemphasize
basic research in favor of applied work that would appeal to the industrial sector [3]. These
types of scientific policy changes and philosophies can be linked to structural changes in indus-
trial research and development (R&D) characterized by the outsourcing of basic research,
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downsizing of in-house basic research activities, and prioritization of firms’ core competencies
[4]. In short, for firms thinking about the immediate commercial viability of products and for
scientific benefactors who desire immediate, concrete results, basic research can seem like an
uncertain and risky endeavor.
Conversely, universities have become active participants in applied research. In the United
States, the founding and expansion of business and engineering schools in the mid-20th Cen-
tury created new links between universities and industries, while also creating professional
homes for many research scientists who had formerly been employed in industry [5]. The pass-
ing of the Bayh-Dole act in 1980 propelled innovation in universities, by allowing academic
institutions to pursue and retain profits from patenting activities. Similar policies have diffused
throughout the developed world, underpinning extensive research and commercial activity in
universities [6]. Through patenting and educating a skilled workforce, universities serve as a
major source of economic development and activity in the contemporary economy [7]. How-
ever, with declining research funds available in many universities, some academic researchers
have turned to industry funding as a means for conducting research, often with productive
and mutually beneficial outcomes [8]. Such perceived decline of industrial research contrasts
with the thesis of Gibbons et al. [9] who, more than two decades ago, heralded the demise of
the academic control of science—and the corresponding rise of other sectors’ research activi-
ties. While several studies have since sought to demonstrate the central role of universities, as
well as the contribution of other sectors to the production of knowledge [10,11,12,13,14,15],
they have failed to provide historical or global trends. This paper addresses this gap by provid-
ing a historical analysis of institutional sectors’ basic and applied research production across
the past four decades, using scholarly articles and utility patents as evidence of this production.
Materials and methods
Data sources
This paper uses two data sources: the Web of Science for the 1980–2014 period
(N = 28,420,363 papers) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data-
base for the 1976–2014 period (N = 4,969,210). Both databases have been transformed into
SQL relational databases to allow for the compilation of advanced bibliometric indicators.
Assignment of institutional sectors in papers
Articles, notes, and reviews published between 1980 and 2014 and indexed in Thomson Reu-
ters’ Web of Science containing affiliation data were included in the analysis. These papers
contained 58,015,879 institutional addresses, which were coded into four sectors (universities,
governments, industry, and other), following common practice [10,15] using a set of keywords
(Appendix 1). The institutional field of WoS was mined for evidence of these keywords. Hospi-
tals—generally marked in WoS with “HOSP”—were either categorized in the universities sec-
tor when they contained the string “UNIV”—as in UNIV-HOSP—, in the industrial sector
when they had markers such as “INC” or “CORP”, or in the others sector when they could not
be categorized in the two previously mentioned categories.
While this method does not lead to a high assignation of distinct institutions (Table 1)—
with only 57.7% of institutions having a sector attributed—these institutions are responsible
for the large majority of papers. Indeed, this assignation process has led to the attribution of a
sector for 95.9% of fractionalized papers (obtained by calculating institution and sector’s share
of each paper, and then summing it for all papers), and for 94.8% of paper-institutions combi-
nations (Table 1). The proportion of fractionalized papers to which a sector could be assigned
varied by country: for example, while only a small proportion of fractionalized papers for the
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United States (2.1%), Japan (1.9%), China (2.1%), Canada (2.0%) could not be assigned a sec-
tor, this percentage is higher for Germany (5.8%), UK (4.9%), France (4.3%), as well as for
USSR/Russia (16.2%).
Publication indicators
Results are presented as fractionalized numbers of papers, to take into account the increase in
interinstitutional collaboration. For instance, a paper that has three universities, one industry,
and one government address will count as 0.6 of a university, 0.2 of an industry, and 0.2 of a
government paper. These fractionalized numbers of articles are then summed for each sector
and divided by the total number of articles, to obtain the relative contribution of each sectors’
to publication activity at the world and country levels. For this calculation, unknown sectors
are removed from the denominator. Citation indicators are field-normalized. We compile, for
each speciality and each publication year, the percentile rank of each paper in the citation dis-
tribution, and aggregate for each sector the proportion of papers that fall in the top 5% most
cited. When the share of top 5% most cited papers is above 5%, it means that the sector scores
above average; when it is below, it means the opposite. Disciplines and specialities used are
those of the U.S. National Science Foundation in its Science and Engineering Indicators series,
which are based on the journals in which researchers publish. These are grouped into five
broad domains to assess sector’s contribution to world papers.
Assignment of institutional sectors in patents
In order to compare publication patterns across sectors, we assigned institutional sectors to
assignees (i.e., owners of the commercialization rights to a patent) of utility patents granted by






N % N %
Governments 2,251,488 7.9% 4,010,115 9.8% 178,583 8.8%
Industries 1,401,617 4.9% 2,370,779 5.8% 346,509 17.0%
Universities 20,241,316 70.9% 26,872,555 65.5% 331,452 16.3%
Others 3,476,657 12.2% 5,639,372 13.8% 318,585 15.6%
Unknown 1,168,082 4.1% 2,116,279 5.2% 862,583 42.3%
All Sectors 28,539,160 100.0% 41,009,100 100.0% 2,037,712 100.0%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.t001






N % N %
Governments 57,099 1.3% 59,359 1.3% 8,088 0.8%
Industries 3,953,185 90.3% 3,968,809 89.8% 849,549 84.7%
Universities 115,089 2.6% 123,338 2.8% 28,353 2.8%
Others 11,327 0.3% 12,470 0.3% 4,741 0.5%
Unknown 243,468 5.6% 254,400 5.8% 109,859 11.0%
All Sectors 4,380,168 100.0% 4,418,376 100.0% 1,003,115 100.0%
Individuals 732,155 - 734,929 - - -
 excluding individuals
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.t002
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the USPTO over the 1976–2014 period (N = 4,969,210). Patents contain two categories of
assignees: individuals and organisations. Hence, only institutional assignees were assigned a
sector; patents owned by individuals were assigned in the “individuals” sector. For institutional
assignees, the same sectoral assignation key and procedure described above for papers was
used in patents, with a few adaptations. For instance, while institutions names in WoS are
abbreviated (UNIV for University, “GOV” for governments, etc., see: https://images.
webofknowledge.com/WOK46P9/help/WOS/h_adabrv.html), they appear in full in the
USPTO database. Hence, we use full strings rather than abbreviated ones.
As shown in Table 2, the share of unknown distinct institutional assignees (11.0%) is much
lower than that obtained for publications. However, for fractionalized number of patents and
of patent-assignees combinations, the proportion of unknowns is quite similar to that obtained
for scholarly papers. As one might expect, most institutional assignees of patents are industries,
representing 84.7% of all assignees, 89.9% of patent-assignees pairs, and 90.3% of fractionalized
numbers of patents.
Patent indicators
While co-ownership of patents (i.e., two or more assignees on the same patent) is much less
frequent than interinstitutional collaboration papers, we nonetheless compiled sectors’ share
of patent assignees as a fractionalized numbers of patents. For instance, a patent with one
industry and one individual as assignees would could as 0.5 of an industrial patent and 0.5 of
an individual patent. These fractionalized numbers of patents are then summed for each sector
and divided by the total number of patent, to obtain the relative contribution of each sectors’
to patenting activities at the world levels. For this calculation, unknown sectors are removed
from the denominator.
Results
Fig 1 presents the share of papers published by each institutional sector, as well as collaborative
and scientific impact trends. It shows that there has been a marked increase in the share of
papers published by universities at the world level, with corresponding decreases in all other
sectors (Fig 1A). This trend is observed for most of the most productive countries (Figs A and
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Fig 1. (A) Proportion of fractionalized papers, (B) proportion of papers written in collaboration with universities, and (C) scientific
impact, by sector (world level), 1980–2014.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.g001
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from industry decreased from more than 15,500 in the beginning of the nineties to less than
9,900 in 2014. The dominance of universities in the dissemination of research is even more
apparent when considering collaboration: for example, the number of industry papers co-
authored with universities increased from 21% in 1980 to 76% in 2014 (Fig 1B). A similar
trend can be observed across all other sectors, demonstrating that non-university sectors are
not only less active in producing research papers, but increasingly collaborative with universi-
ties when they publish. These collaborative relationships have mutual benefits: papers co-
authored with researchers affiliated with other sectors are more cited than single-sector publi-
cations (Fig 1C).
There are strong disciplinary variations in the portfolio of published research by sector (Fig
2). Over the last three decades, universities have maintained an almost complete monopoly
over publications in mathematics, social sciences, and humanities (Fig 2A). In contrast, while
the university share of engineering and technology publications was less than 60% in the
1980s, it has increased to 87% in 2014—a consequence of the decline in the share of industrial
research in this area (from 25% to 3%) (Fig 2B). Governments are most active in the natural
sciences (Fig 2C), which can be traced to historical governmental mandates in areas like wild-
life management, environment, and natural resources. However, the share of governmental
papers declined by about 33% in natural sciences, health, and medicine, and by about 50% in
engineering and technology between 1980 and 2014.
Our results highlight a dramatic decline in the diffusion of research by the industrial and
governmental sectors, with a parallel increase in the share of partnerships between academe
and other sectors. While for the United States these results are consistent with OECD data on
the production of basic research (Figs 3 and 4) performed by governments—which declined
from 31% in 1981 to 14% in 2013—they may appear inconsistent with OECD data for indus-
tries showing relatively stable investments of industry in basic research [13]. That is, the OECD
confirms a decrease in basic research activity in the governmental sector—mostly to the benefit
of the higher education sector—, but an increase in investments in basic research in industries
over the last 10 years, as well as a stable proportion of all types of executed R&D throughout
the period. This discontinuity suggests at least two possible explanations: either published
research is poorly related to what the OECD categorizes as basic research and industries are
indeed decreasing their basic research activities; or industries perform basic research at the
same (or increasing) rate but have declined proportionally—and absolutely in some countries
like the US and the UK—to disseminate this work in published research. In short, industries
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Fig 2. Proportion of world papers authored by(A) Universities, (B) Industries and (C) Governments, by discipline, 1980–2014.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.g002
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Scholarly papers are not the only evidence of an active research enterprise. Patenting is
another source of evidence for research activity. Therefore, to understand the state of research
by sector one must also account for this mode of production. An examination of historical pat-
enting trends (Fig 5) demonstrates the increasing dominance of industry in patenting, increas-
ing from 73.7% in 1976 to 87.6% in 2014, mainly at the expense of patents owned by
individual inventors. This suggests that industries remain actively involved in research—at
least, in the type of research that leads to patenting—but does not demonstrate whether this
happens at the expense of research production. To test this, we compiled historical patenting
and publication rates for three well-known private firms with established research portfolios:
Bell Laboratories, Apple, and Google. All three cases show a decline of basic research produc-
tion and an increase in patenting activity. Bell Laboratories registered 5 times more papers
than patents for most of the 1980s, but this ratio was reversed in 2014. Apple registered a simi-
lar number of papers and patents until the 1990s. However, the company has not published
more than 10 papers in a given year since 1998, but registered 2,200 patents in 2014. Google
also published more papers than it filed patents until 2009, but registered 10 times more pat-
ents than published papers in 2014. These cases are exemplary, but suggest a shifting focus












































































Fig 4. Proportion of (A) funding and (B) execution of R&D activities, by sector, United States, 1981–2013 (OECD Statistics).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.g004
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Discussion and conclusion
Universities are moving towards a nearly exclusive monopoly over the publication of scientific
articles. Industries, on the other hand, are vanishing from this production model, despite an
infusion of investments in basic research and being increasingly dominant the patent produc-
tion space. This suggests that there is not a decline in industries’ research activity, but rather in
its diffusion to the scientific community. This secrecy of basic research in industry—and corre-
sponding concentration of publication of basic research in universities—threatens both the
pursuit of basic knowledge and industrial competitiveness. For instance, it may lead to a grad-
ual depletion of the collective pool of basic knowledge [16], which is essential to maintain
innovative capacity and translate basic knowledge into technological innovation [17]. The type
of research pursued by industry can complement purely academic pursuits: science in industry
has been shown to be less bound by theoretical matters and more prone to speculation, which
can be conducive to innovation [18]. Evidence of the complementary nature of these sectors is
shown in the citation advantage for collaboration: partnerships between university and indus-
try realizes the highest scientific impact. This has also been demonstrated in the success of geo-
graphic research clusters, such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, and the North Carolina Research
Triangle. Our results suggest that a diversity of actors in the scientific system leads to the high-
est impact results.
All sectors are relying more heavily on collaborations with universities for publications.
However, the bridge between universities and industry is routinely crossed by university-
trained doctoral students [19–21]. This may lead to several misalignments, due to various
value systems in academe and industry [22]: While university researchers are increasingly
rushing to “publish or perish”, there is no such culture in industries and governments, where
other forms of knowledge diffusions are privileged (e.g., patents in industry and white papers
and reports for governmental research). In other words, while incentives for academics to pub-
lish have increased, no such incentives exist for firms. In contrast, industrial authors may be
reticent to publish for fear of divulging trade secrets and losing competitive advantage [23]; a
hypothesis that is reinforced by the growing emphasis of the industrial sector on patenting.
This may explain why, despite accounting for a stable share of R&D expenditure—both in
terms of funding and execution (Fig 4)—and for an increasing proportion of basic research
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Fig 5. (a) Share of patent ownership (USPTO) by institutional sector, all countries, 1976–2014, (b) number of papers published and
patents owned, Apple, Bell Laboratories (and various owners) and Google, 1980–2014.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202120.g005
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surprising, therefore, that doctoral students seeking industrial positions place a lower value on
publishing than their university-oriented peers [24]. Despite this, firms with higher propor-
tions of young, university-trained researchers produce more scientific publications [25], per-
haps a holdover from their training.
As case studies of European and Japanese firms have shown [26], firms publish when per-
forming long term research and to signal the existence of tacit knowledge in their organiza-
tions. Thus, decline in industrial publishing activities suggest that these functions are
becoming less important. Disclosure in industry has also been problematized by issues of com-
petition and intellectual property, despite advances in open innovation [27]. While there may
be industrial advantages to “selective” [28] and “free” revealing [29], our results reinforce that
an open science strategy [30] is neither the norm nor the direction of industries. Given that
open flows and interchanges of knowledge and labor between institutions is conducive to
innovation and success in industry [31], institutional norms and strategies that promote exces-
sive secrecy can be myopic and could undermine industry-wide productivity, and at odd with
an increasingly open scientific environment [32,33].
An open flow of ideas and information among sectors is essential to remain competitive in
the contemporary knowledge economy. The growing monopolization of published research
by universities and the vanishing of industries from this communicative space represents a
major threat to this economy. Unidirectional flows of information have negative effects upon
all sectors for knowledge production and innovation. Industries and universities must rethink
strategies for partnerships and publishing to maximize scientific progress and to ensure the
greatest gains for society.
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